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*  
The main purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of trade reform on unemployment 
and  social  welfare  in  a  Harris-Todaro  (1970)  economy  with  efficiency  wage  and  capital 
mobility. The analysis shows that capital mobility plays an important role to influence the 
impact of trade reform on unemployment and social welfare. We find that trade reform raises 
urban  unemployment  and  produces  an  ambiguous  effect  on  social  welfare  when  capital  is 
perfectly mobile among the three sectors. However, such policy lowers unemployment and 
raises social welfare when capital is imperfectly mobile.   
JEL classification:  F01, O24   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
At  the  present  juncture,  the  importance  of  the  informal  sector  has  gained 
momentum in the developing countries. In Africa, 60 percent of total urban employment 
is found in the informal sector. The figures reach 57 percent in Bolivia and Madagaskar, 
56 percent in Tanzania, 53 percent in Colombia, 48 percent in Thailand and 46 percent in 
Venezuela. In Uganda, we find 90 percent of the total non-farm private sector workers 
are  engaged  in  the  informal  sector  [see  Haan  (2002)].  According  to  the  OECD,  the 
Mexican informal units provide 44 percent of urban employment [see Franco (1999)].  In 
the  European  Union,  20  million  workers  are  employed  in  informal  sector.  Thus,  the 
inclusion  of  the  informal  sector  in  the  analysis  of  economic  development  is  highly 
justified for the developing countries. 
Recently, researchers have paid adequate attention to trade liberalisation and its 
effects  on  the  economy.  In  some  countries,  trade  reform  reduces  unemployment  and 
raises informal wage, while others experience the opposite. Thus, informal sector and 
trade policies are two important issues in development economics.  
The  Harris-Todaro  framework  is  a  very  useful  analytical  tool  to  investigate  a 
variety of questions relating to development economics, where informal economy and 
international trade are very prominent issues.  
Urban informal sector has been included in the Harris-Todaro (1970) economy in a 
variety of models most important of which are Portes (1969), Chandra (1991), Chandra and 
Khan (1993), Grinols (1991), Stiglitz (1982), Fields (1989, 1990), Rauch (1991), Gupta  
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(1993, 1997), and Bandopadhyay and Gupta (1995), Yabuuchi (2001, 2005), Chaudhuri 
(2003a) etc. Chandra and Khan (1993) develop a generalised Harris-Todaro (1970) model 
incorporating informal sector and capital mobility. Fields (1989, 1990) includes informal 
sector in a multisector labour market model. Rauch (1991, 1993) analyses poverty and 
inequality in a Harris-Todaro (1970) economy. Gupta (1993, 1997) also considers informal 
sector and capital mobility in a generalized Harris-Todaro (1970) economy. Bandopadhyay 
and Gupta (1995) make comparative static analysis in a Harris-Todaro (1970) model with 
capital  mobility.  Chaudhuri  (2003b)  also  include  informal  sector  and  investigate  some 
policy effects in a Harris-Todaro (1970) economy. Grinols (1991) re-examines the welfare 
impact of tariff policy in a Harris-Todaro (1970) economy.  
Khan (1993) develops a multisector Harris-Todaro (1970) model to analyse some 
issues relating to international trade and economic development. Jones and Marjit (1992) 
also  reconsider  the Khan (1991)  model.  Kar  and  Marjit (2001),  Marjit (2002, 2003), 
Marjit, Kar, and Sarkar (2003), Marjit and Acharyya (2003) investigate the impact of 
trade reform on the informal economy and they show that such effect depends upon the 
nature of capital mobility between formal and informal sector and the global exposure of 
all the goods produced in the economy. Trade liberalisation expands informal sector if 
capital is specific to the formal sector and all the goods are internationally traded.  
Further, a number of trade related issues have been analysed in a variety of models 
which are purely Harris-Todaro (1970) in nature. For instance, Khan and Lin (1982), 
Chao and Yu (1997, 1999) show that gains from trade depends on the nature of the rural 
as  well  as  urban  commodity.  Bhagwati  and  Srinivasan  (1977)  and  Chaudhuri  and 
Mukopadhyay (2003) analyse the effects of education policy in a trade theoretic model of 
the  Harris-Todaro  economy.  Panagariya  and  Succar  (1986),  Beladi  (1988)  and  Choi 
(1999) discuss trade related issues in a Harris-Todaro (1970) model with variable returns 
to scale. Gupta and Gupta (1998) develop a Harris-Todaro (1970) model incorporating 
foreign enclave to analyse various trade related issues. Khan and Naqvi (1983), Chao and 
Yu (1992) describe a trade theoretic Harris-Todaro (1970) model with capital market 
distortion. Khan (1979, 1991), Khan and Chaudhuri (1985) consider interaction of ethnic 
groups in a Harris-Todaro (1970) framework. Beladi and Ingene (1994) introduce risk 
and uncertainty in a Harris-Todaro (1970) economy. 
Thus, the use of Harris-Todaro (1970) model to analyse the issues relating to the 
informal sector and international trade is justified.  
It is almost known that labour standards signal job quality. Compliance with 
labour  standard  ensures  job  in  high  productivity  formal  sector,  whereas  low-
productive  informal  sector  employs  workers  having  no  compliance  with  labour 
standard.
1  The,  formal-informal  distinction  with  respect  to  Government  regulation 
has been observed in the works of Marcouiller and Young (1995), Dessy and Pallage 
(2003),  Azuma  and  Grossman  (2002),  Boeri   and  Garibaldi  (2002),  Goldberg  and 
Pavenik (2003) and Rauch (1991). Goldberg and Pavenik (2003) offer an efficiency 
wage  model  of  the  informal  sector.  In  their  model,  regulation  protecting  formal 
sector  workers  ensures  they  can  not  be  monitored  and  they  receive  above-market 
wages inorder to discourage shirking.   
1It  is  assumed  that  the  rural  sector  is  more  productive  than  the  urban  informal  sector  and  this  is 
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It is universally accepted that employers can raise workers’ productivity by paying 
higher wages and this is justified for the low wage sector having no labour standard. 
Thus, the efficiency-wage relation is applicable to the urban informal sector.
2 The idea of 
the efficiency-wage theory first developed by Leibenstein (1957) and then Stiglitz (1976), 
Bliss and Stern (1978), Akerlof and Yellen (1986) and Weiss (1990). The basic idea of 
the efficiency-wage theory is that a worker’s efficiency is positively related to the wage 
rate he receives. This is generally valid in the case of low income workers who consume 
the whole wage income and suffer from malnutrition. The employers use this wage as an 
instrument  of  profit  maximisation  and  the  optimum  wage  appears  to  be  unique  and 
independent of other economic variables. Urban unemployment may be explained by the 
efficiency-wage relation in the urban informal sector.
3 
In this paper, we introduce efficiency-wage and capital mobility in a trade theoretic 
generalised Harris-Todaro (1970) economy. Two types of capital mobility are cosidered here: 
(1) capital is perfectly mobile among the three sectors; (2) capital is mobile between the 
formal sector and the rural sector, while the urban informal sector uses sector specific capital.
4  
Our model differs from the existing works on informal economy and trade reform 
on  the following grounds: (1) we distinguish  between formal and  informal sector  by 
compliance with labour regulation; (2) we consider urban unemployment and explain this 
in terms of efficiency-wage relation in the urban informal sector; (3) we introduce two 
types  of  intersectoral  mobility  of  capital  which  are  usually  absent  in  the  standard 
literature on trade reform.  
The general equilibrium effects of trade reform on urban unemployment, on the 
size of the informal sector and on the social welfare are also examined in this paper. Our 
analysis reveals that the nature of intersectoral mobility of capital plays important role to 
determine the impact of reformatory policy on urban unemployment and social welfare in 
the post-reform period. 
Section 2 describes the model and the results. The concluding remarks are given in 
Section 3.  
2.  MODEL AND RESULTS 
We consider a small open economy consisting of three sectors: the urban formal 
sector (u ), the urban informal sector (i) and the rural sector (r) . The products (Xu) of the 
urban formal sector is import-goods and the product (Xr  ) of the rural sector is export-
goods. The product prices of these two goods are exogenously given by the rest of the 
world. However, the informal sector produces non-traded goods (Xi), the prices of which 
is determined within the domestic market.  
The production functions of all the three sectors exhibit constant returns to scale 
and have positive and diminishing marginal productivity to each input. Each sector uses 
only two inputs—Capital and Labour. Capital is measured in physical unit, while labour 
is measured in efficiency unit.
5  
2It is assumed that the rural sector is more capitalised which ensures higher efficiency for the workers. 
3Fields (1989) explains urban unemployment in a framework where people remain unemployed for full 
time searching for urban formal sector jobs. Gupta (1993) explains this in terms of market clearing for the rural 
sector’s product whose price is fixed. 
4We find this type of capital mobility in Gupta (1997) and Grinols (1991). 
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We distinguish between formal and informal sector by compliance with labour 
regulation.  We  assume  that  formal  sector  complies  with  labour  regulation.  Such 
regulation maintains labour standard by paying minimum wgae ( u), which is higher 
than the market-clearing level. However, the urban informal sector is unregulated and do 
not comply with labour standard and pay lower wage ( i). Urban formal sector’s wage 
rate is institutionally fixed
6 and is higher than the rural sector’s wage rate which is again 
higher than the wage rate in the urban informal sector.  
Workers’ efficiency (h) is positively related to the wage rate he receives. Such 
efficiency-wage  relations  is  more  pronounced  when  the  wage  rate  is  low  due  to  the 
absence of labour standard. It is assumed that the workers’ efficiency is equal to unity 
after a certain level of wage ( ) and is less than unity below that specified level. The 
wage rates in the rural sector ( r) and the urban formal sector ( u) are assumed to be 
higher than this specified level.
7   The wage rate in the urban informal sector is assumed 
to be lower than this level.
8   Thus, for the urban formal sector and the rural sector, the 
labour  expressed  in  labour  time  unit  is  identical  to  that  expressed  in  efficiency unit. 
However, for the urban informal sector, efficiency units of labour differ from the labour 
time units of labour. 
All the markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. The assumption of CRS 
production function and profit maximising behaviour of the firm implies the equality 
between price and unit cost in each of the three sector and the minimisation of cost of one 
efficiency unit of labour. 
Workers migrate from the rural sector to the urban region. But some of them are 
absorbed either in the urban formal sector or in the urban informal sector and a portion of 
the migrants remains unemployed in the urban region. The migration mechanism is of 
Harris-Todaro (1970) type. So, in migration equilibrium, the actual rural wage rate is 
equal to the expected urban wage rate. 
It is assumed that the urban formal sector is more capital intensive than the rural 
sector which is again more capital intensive than the urban informal sector.
9 
The common equation structure used in the two models is as follows 
The intensive production functions in the three sectors are given by the following 
equations: 
u X  =  ) ( u u u k f L  …  …  …  …  …  …  (1) 
i X  =  ) , ( i i i k h f L  …  …  …  …  …  …  (2) 
r X  =  ) ( r r r k f L  …  …  …  …  …  …  (3) 
The efficiency-wage relation is given by 
) ( i h h  with  , 1 , 0 , 0 h h h  for  ~  and  1 h  for  ~
 
…  (4)  
6This is set by labour standard. 
7Urban  formal  sector  wage  is  higher  due  to  labour  standard  and  rural  wage  is  higher  due  to  its 
capitalistic structure of production. 
8This is due to the absence of labour standard in the urban informal sector. 
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The cost of one efficiency unit of labour in the urban informal sector is:  
) ( / i i i h
 
…  …  …  …  …  …  …  (5) 
The condition for minimisation of the cost of one efficiency unit of labour is: 
1 )) ( / ) ( i i i h h  …  …  …  …  …  …  (6) 
The  Harris-Todaro  (1970)  migration  equilibrium  condition  is  given  by  the 
following equation: 
) 1 /( ) 1 /( r i i r u u r L L L L
 
…  …  …  …  …  (7) 
where  r i u L L L , ,   are the level of employment in the three sectors and the total labour 
endowment in the economy is assumed to be 1. 
The labour endowment equation is given by the following: 
1 U L L L r i u  …  …  …  …  …  …  (8) 
Where U is the level of urban unemployment. 
We consider the welfare measure of Sen (1974). Thus, the social welfare is given by 
SW = E(1–M)  …  …  …  …  …  …  …  (9) 
Where E is the average income of all workers and M is the Gini-coefficient of the income 
distribution of the workers. 
Using Equations (7), (8) and (9) we get,
10 
SW =  ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( U L L L L L i i r u r u r u r
 
…  …  …  (9.1) 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  set  of  Equations  given  by  (1)  –  (8)  and  (9.1)  are 
independent of the nature of capital mobility assumptions to be discussed below.  
2.1.  Capital Mobility among the Urban Formal Sector,  
Urban Informal Sector, and the Rural Sector 
In this section, we assume perfect mobility of domestic capital among the three 
domestic  capital  using  sector.  Thus,  we  have  a  common  rate  of  return  on  domestic 
capital. We also assume that u-sector is more capital intensive than the r-sector which is 
more capital intensive than the i-sector in value terms. 
Along with the Equations (1) to (8) and (9.1) the following additional Equations 
are to be considered here: 
The long-run equilibrium of a competitive firm implies that price is equal to the 
unit cost. Hence we have the following equations: 
) , ( ) 1 ( R C t P u u u
 
…  …  …  …  …  …  (10) 
) , ( R v C P i i i
 
…  …  …  …  …  …  (11) 
) , ( R C P r r r
 
…  …  …  …  …  …  (12)  
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The full utilisation of capital stock leads to the following equation: 
K L K L k L k r r i i u u
 
…  …  …  …  …  …  (13) 
The equilibrium of informal sector is characterised by the equality between the 
demand for and the supply of its product because this sector produces a non-traded good. 
Thus, we have, 
) ( ) , ( i i i i p D k h f L
 
…  …  …  …  …  …  (14) 
Here, D(pi) represents the demand for the product of the urban informal sector; and 
0 ) ( i p D . For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the income effect of the demand 
for this non-traded good is nil. 
The profit maximising  capital intensities in  the three sectors are related  to  the 
factor price ratios in the corresponding sectors. So we have, 
), / ( R k k u u u     0 u k  …  …  …  …  …  …  (15) 
), / ( R v k k i i i       0 , i k  …  …  …  …  …  …  (16) 
), / ( R k k r r r     0 r k  …  …  …  …  …  …  (17) 
This completes the equation structure of the model. 
The working of the model is described as follows: 
Equation (9) determines the equilibrium value of  i. Then, we get the value of vi 
from Equation (8) and of  h  from Equation (4). Equation (5) yields the value of R, given 
Pu and  u. So,  i is obtained from Equation (7), given Pr. Equation (6) determines the 
value  of  Pi,  given  the  equilibrium  values  of  vi  and  R.  Thus,  we  get 
R R R r i u / , / , / . So, we can determine the equilibrium values of  r i u k k k , , from 
Equations (15), (16) and (17). Equation (13) yields Li, given the equilibrium values of h, 
ki, Pi. We can solve for Lu, Lr from Equations (7) and (8). 
The equilibrium values of  r i u X X X , ,  are obtained from Equations (1), (2) and (3) 
respectively. Now, Equation (8) yields equilibrium values of U.  Finally, we can solve for 
S.W. from Equation (9.1). 
Proposition 1.  A fall in t raises urban unemployment. However, its effects on the 
level of employment in the urban informal sector and social welfare are ambiguous.  
Proof. If t is reduced, Equation (5) shows that R will fall. From Equation (7), we 
find that  r will rise. Equation (6) shows that  i P  will also fall when R falls, given  i v . 
Thus,  R R R r i u / , / , / will rise; and so  also  r i u k k k , , . 
When  i P  falls,  ) ( i p D  rises. Looking at the Equation (13) we find that  i L  may 
move in any direction when  i P  falls and  i k  rises, given  h . Hence, the KK curve shifts 
downward because  r i u k k k , ,  rise. However, the  LL
 
curve may shift in any direction. 
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However,  looking  at  the  Equation  (11),  we  find  that  (Lu,  Li,  Lr)  falls  when 
r i u k k k , ,  rise and  K
 
is given. Thus, Equation (12) shows that U will rise in the new 
equilibrium. The effect on S.W. is ambiguous, since  i r u L L L *, *, ,   may move in any 
direction when t falls.  
2.2.  Capital Mobility between Urban Formal Sector and Rural Sector 
In this section, we relax the assumption of perfect mobility of capital. Here, we 
follow Grinols (1991); and assume that the informal sector uses only informal capital, 
while both the rural sector and the formal sector use formal capital. Thus, in equilibrium, 
we have a common rate of return on formal capital in these two sectors. However, the 
urban informal sector uses the informal capital which is sector-specific. So there exists a 
different interest rate in the informal capital market. 
Along with the Equations (1) to (8), and Equation (9.1) the following additional 
Equations are to be considered here: 
As the unit cost is equal to the effective price in competitive equilibrium in each of 
the three sectors, we have the following three equations: 
) , ( ) 1 ( f u u u R C t P
 
…  …  …  …  …  …  (10a)  
) , ( i i i i R v C P
 
…  …  …  …  …  …  (11a) 
) , ( f r r r R C P
 
…  …  …  …  …  …  (12a) 
The full utilisation of the stock of formal capital and the informal capital leads to 
the following two equations: 
i i i K L k
 
…  …  …  …  …  …  …  (13a) 
f r r u u K L k L k
 
…  …  …  …  …  …  …  (14a) 
), / ( f u u u R k k    0 u k  …  …  …  …  …  …  (15a) 
), / ( i i i i R v k k
 
0 i k   …  …  …  …  …  …  (16a) 
), / ( f r r r R k k     0 r k …  …  …  …  …  …  (17a) 
Equation  (6)  determines  the  equilibrium  value  of  i .  Then,  we  get  h  from 
Equation (4), and  i v from Equation (5).   i R  is obtained from Equation (11a), given Pi. 
Thus,  i i R / ( )  is  determined  and  hence,  we  get  optimum  i k .  i L  is  obtained  from 
Equation (13), given  i K .  Equation (2) gives  i X . Equations (10a) and (12a) determine 
f R  and  r . Then Equations (15) and (17) determine u k  and r k .  Now, we can solve for 
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We assume that the urban region is more capital intensive than the rural region in 
value terms. The equilibrium value of U  is obtained from Equation (8). Finally, we get 
SW from Equation (9.1). 
Proposition 2. Reduction in t lowers urban unemployment and improves social 
welfare. However, it has no effect on employment in the urban informal sector. 
Proof. Fall in t does not affect  i L  because  u P  does not enter into the system of 
determination of  i i i k R , ,
 
and  i L . If is reduced, Equation (10a) shows that  f R  will fall. 
t when  f R  falls,  r has to rise to keep the Equation (12a) satisfied. Hence,  ) ( f u R
 
and  ) ( f r R
 
rise and so also  u k  and  r k . This causes excess demand for mobile capital. 
Thus, the capital intensive sector contracts and the labour intensive sector expands. So, in 
equilibrium,  u L  falls and  r L  rises. This result is also derived mathematically in the 
Appendix (C).  
The strict capital intensity condition also implies that  r L   rises more than the fall 
in  u L . Thus, U falls, given  and  i L and  L . This is also obtained from Equation (18).  
As t falls,  r
 
rises,  u L  falls,  r L  rises,  ) ( r u L L rises,  U falls and  i i L ,
 
remain 
unchanged.  From Equation (9.1), we find that the first term rises. The third term also rises. 
The second term falls if the elasticity of rural employment with respect to the urban-rural 
wage gap is less than 1.
11 This is shown in the Appendix (D). Thus, social welfare improves.   
3.  CONCLUSION 
The reformatory policy produces ambiguous effects in different countries in  the 
global economy. The present paper mainly focuses on the employment and welfare aspects 
of trade reform. Two types of capital mobility are considered in this paper: perfect capital 
mobility among the urban formal sector, the rural sector and the urban informal sector; and 
imperfect capital mobility between the urban formal sector and the rural sector, while urban 
informal sector uses sector-specific capital. Tariff reduction raises the problem of urban 
unemployment and produces ambiguous effect on social welfare in the case of perfect 
mobility of capital. However, such reformatory policy lowers urban unemployment and 
raises social welfare if capital is mobile only between the urban formal sector and the rural 
sector. Thus, our analysis shows that the degree of capital mobility plays important role 
when we examine the impact of trade reform on unemployment and social welfare. The 
theoretical  results  may  shed  light  on  the  observed  behaviour  of  the  small  globalised 
economies with respect to unemployment and social welfare.   
APPENDIX A  
The average income of all workers is: 
r i i r r u u L L L E
 
…  …  …  …  …  …  (19) 
i i r r i r r i u u i u i u r u r u U L U L L L U L L L L L EM ) ( ) ( ) ( (20)  
11 It is assumed that  ) ( r u r f L , where  . 0 f Trade Reform, Capital Mobility, and Efficiency Wage  171
Using Equations (7) and (8) and (20) we get, 
) 1 ( ) ( ) ( U L L L U L EM i i r u r u i i
 
…  …  … (20.1) 
Now, using Equations (9), (19) and (20.1) we get Equation (9.1).  
APPENDIX B  
The total differential of Equations (7) and (13) are given by: 
i i u u r r i i i r d L dL d L L dL dL ) (    …  …  …  …  (18) 
) ( i i r r i i i r r dk L dk L dK dL k dL k
 
…  …  …  …  (19) 
Let 
 
be the determinant of the coefficient matrix of the endogenous variables in the 






  if  ( ) ( ) i i i i r r r i L K R L K R
 
This implies that the rural sector is more capital intensive than the urban informal 
sector in value terms. Hence, 
) ( ) ( 1 i i r r i i i i u u r r i r dk L dk L dK d L dL d L L k dL
 
… (A.1.) 
i i u u r r r i i r r i r i d L dL d L L k dk L dk L dK dL ) ( ) ( 1  … (A.2.) 
Now put  0 i r i i r dk dk dK d d  in the expressions (A.1.) and (A.2.). 
Then we get,  0 ) ( i u u r k dL dL .  
APPENDIX C  
i i i i r r r r u u d L dL d L L dL dL ) (  …  …  …  (20) 
r r u u f r r u u dk L dk L dK dL k dL k
 
…  …  …  …  (21) 
Let 
 
be the determinant of the coefficient matrix of the endogenous variables in 
the system. So,  0 u r r u k k  if  r r r f i i u u u f L K R L L K R ) ( 
This implies that urban region is more capital intensive than the rural region in 
value terms. Hence,  
)] ( } ) {( [ 1 r r u u f r i i i r r u dk L dK L dK dL d L L k dL
 
…  … (A.3.) 
}] ) {( ) ( [ 1 i i i i r r u r r u u f u r d L dL d L L k dk L dk L dK dL … (A.4.) 
Put,  0 f i i dK d dL  in the expressions (A.3.), (A.4.).  Then we get, 
0 }] ) ( ) ( { ) [( / 1 / r r r r u u r r r r u d dk L d dk L k L L d dL  and  
0 )] ( } ) ( ) ( { [ 1 r u r r r r u u u r r L L k d dk L d dk L d dl 
) )( ( u r r j u j dP d d dL dP dL  for j=u, r. Titas Kumar Bandopadhyay  172
APPENDIX D  
The second term is: 
) ( r u r u w L L . 
The total differential of the second term is 
) ( ) ( ) ( r u r u r r u u u r u r d L L dL L dL L
 
=  1 )) ( ) (( ) ( ) ( r u r r r u r u r u u r u r L dL d L L dL L 
=  Lr r r u u r u r e d L L dL L 1 ) ( 
=  0 1 ) ( Lr r r u u r u r e d L L dL L since,  0 , 0 r u d dL  and  Lr e <1 
(assumed). 
Thus, the second term falls as t falls.  
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